Veiligheidssituatie in Oromia

In 2024, the government's conflict against the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) – referred to by the government as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)-Shane – entered its sixth year. April 2024 saw a peak in violence, although it subsided in the following months. Internal strife within the OLA erupted into violent clashes in August and September 2024. In September 2024, a faction led by Sagni Nagasa broke away. When the army launched a new offensive in the early autumn of that year, the violence flared up again. On 1 December 2024, the regional government of Oromia announced the signing of a peace agreement with the OLA splinter group under Sagni. Meanwhile, the OLA launched a counteroffensive against the government, inflicting heavy losses on the security forces. Since the agreement was reached, there have been fewer armed confrontations involving the OLA. However, attacks on civilians by various groups, including government forces, have continued.

During the review period from 1 March 2024 to 28 February 2025, the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) recorded 780 incidents in the Oromia region. Over half of these incidents involved armed clashes, primarily between the army and the OLA. Two-fifths of the violence was directed against civilians. ACLED recorded 2,624 fatalities during the research period, including 738 civilian deaths in 780 incidents specifically targeting civilians.

Civilians caught between rebels and government forces are victims of violence perpetrated by all parties to the conflict. They are caught in the crossfire of clashes between armed groups and are subject to inter-communal violence, as well as to arrests, arbitrary detention, extrajudicial executions, the destruction of property, sexual violence, enforced disappearances, abductions, intimidation, extortion and forced recruitment. The lack of law and order is reflected in an increase in violent crime.

The conflict in Oromia is characterised by a complex patchwork of armed actors. Alongside the federal armed forces (the army and the police) and the regional security institutions, there are difficult-to-identify actors in both zones, including OLA splinter groups, local Oromo militias, and ethnic militias from the neighbouring regional states of Amhara and Benishangul-Gumuz. There are also armed civilian groups, which often consist of local farmers and young people.

In May and November 2023, two rounds of peace talks between the government and the OLA failed. Since the end of the first round of talks, the violence in Oromia has shifted geographically. The North Shewa zone has seen a sharp increase in violence and was the most affected zone in the course of 2024, followed by East Wollega, West Shewa, Arsi, Horo Guduru-Wollega, West Wollega and East Shewa. As the OLA operates in remote areas, the conflict mainly takes place in rural regions and villages. As a guerrilla movement, the OLA carries out hit-and-run attacks on government infrastructure in urban areas.

Between July and August 2024, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) counted some 749,534 displaced persons in 729 accessible locations in the Oromia region. In July 2024, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) reported that more than one million people were displaced in the region, 65 % of them due to conflict and 18 % due to drought.

The conflict profoundly impacts the daily lives of civilians, who have limited access to essential services such as healthcare and education in conflict zones.