Veiligheidssituatie (ACLED)

This COI Focus analyses violence in Syria between 1 October 2025 and 28 February 2026, based on data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). A total of 2,056 security incidents were recorded, resulting in 1,329 deaths. The violence falls into three categories: battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians. At least 779 civilian casualties were recorded in total.

According to ACLED, the main actors involved in the violence were unidentified armed groups, the Syrian government army and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The Islamic State (IS), the Israeli army and various militias also played a part. ACLED attributes more than half of the violence against civilians to unidentified groups.

After a relatively stable final quarter of 2025, violence escalated sharply in January 2026, reaching two clear peaks. The first peak saw fighting in Aleppo from 7 to 10 January, followed by a large-scale offensive by the Syrian army against the Kurdish region of the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES) during the second half of the month. A ceasefire was reached at the end of January, after which violence declined significantly in February.

Geographically, the violence was concentrated primarily in the north and north-east. According to ACLED data, the majority of incidents and deaths occurred in four governorates: Aleppo, Hassakeh, Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor. Intense fighting took place in these areas between government forces and the SDF, often accompanied by civilian casualties and reports of executions.

In other governorates, the level of violence was lower, often taking the form of targeted killings, clan conflicts or incidents involving landmines. For example, there was frequent violence against Alawite civilians in Homs, while in Suweida, tensions arose between the Druze and the Bedouin. In Dara'a and Idlib, violence remained limited and sporadic.

Lastly, maps from Liveuamap and the Institute for the Study of War show a clear territorial shift. In January 2026, the SDF lost control of much of their territory, retaining only the areas around Kobani and Qamishli. This development reflects the success of the government's offensive and the shifting power dynamics on the ground.