Veiligheidssituatie

On 26 July 2023, the presidential guard staged a coup in Niger. Since then, the junta has expelled French, German and American military personnel from the country. The new military leaders have turned to Russia and Turkey for military cooperation and assistance. At the regional level, Niger has withdrawn from existing multilateral security initiatives, while simultaneously strengthening cooperation with military juntas in neighbouring Burkina Faso and Mali by establishing the Alliance des Etats du Sahel (AES).

In 2025, Niger is facing a series of security challenges. In the Tillabéri region, there have been uprisings by the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) along the border with Mali, and by the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama'at Nusratul Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) along the border with Burkina Faso. JNIM and ISSP are stepping up their activities in the border regions. This is particularly noticeable in the Dosso region and in the south of the Tahoua region, which is also affected by banditry. The south-eastern region of Diffa is affected by the activities of two rival Boko Haram factions, Jamatu Ahli is-Sunnah lid-Dawatai wal-Jihad (JAS) and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). Organised gangs are active in Maradi, along the southern border with Nigeria.

During the reporting period of this report, from 1 September 2024 to 30 May 2025, the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) recorded 269 incidents in Niger with 977 fatalities. Compared to the same period a year earlier (333 incidents with 1,246 fatalities), there was a noticeable decrease in the number of incidents and fatalities.

Almost half of the violence recorded by ACLED involves battles/armed clashes (45 %), targeting fighting between two (or more) armed actors. ACLED attributes this increase to fighting over territory as jihadist groups seek to expand their power.

More than a third (37.5%) of the total number of recorded violent incidents targeted civilians (civilian targeting), resulting in 262 civilian deaths. ISSP is primarily responsible for this violence. The army and security services, engaged in fighting with armed groups, are unable to protect civilians. Self-defence militias, usually organised along ethnic lines, are fuelling the recruitment of jihadists. Groups such as JNIM are exploiting grievances rooted in ethnic discrimination and state violence.

The regions most affected by violence are Tillabéri (Téra, Torodi, Gotheye, Tillabéri, Abala, Ayuerou and Say), Dosso (Gaya and Dioundiou) and Diffa (Diffa, N'Guigmi and Bosso). The Islamist insurgency in Niger is essentially a rural uprising, with groups such as JNIM and ISSP exercising control in rural areas, while the state retains control of the cities. Sources do point to a new dynamic in Tillabéri, where cities are also experiencing violence. In October 2024, JNIM carried out its first attack within the administrative boundaries of the capital Niamey.

In October 2024, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Niger counted 507,438 internally displaced persons (IDPs), an increase of 25 % compared to the previous year. The Tillabéri region hosts the largest number of IDPs (223,950).

The authorities maintain control over the cities but have little presence outside them. In rural areas, jihadists have consolidated their presence through ideological pressure and economic extortion. Education is suffering from the violence, with 779 schools closed. In addition, violence is the main cause of food insecurity, as people lose their livelihoods after being displaced and restrictions on movement limit access to food. The violence also hinders the delivery of humanitarian aid, although security measures taken by the government also pose obstacles. According to a United Nations (UN) estimate, 4.3 million of the approximately 26 million Nigeriens will need humanitarian aid in 2024.