Situation sécuritaire

Chad lies at the heart of several regional hotspots of instability. Its territory is affected by the presence of rebel groups and mercenaries in the north, the spillover effects of the Sudanese conflict in the east, jihadist violence in the Lake Chad basin in the west, and a volatile security situation along the Central African border in the south. Added to this are the ongoing agro-pastoral and inter-communal conflicts in several regions, particularly in the south and centre of the country.

The Déby dynasty, which draws its support from the Zaghawa ethnic minority, has silenced the political opposition and civil society. Chad, the last bastion of stability in the Sahel region, has long been regarded as one of the few reliable Western allies. However, despite the regime’s reluctance to develop closer cooperation with Russia, its unilateral suspension of military cooperation with France, and the emergence of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as a new key partner have reshaped the constellation of international alliances.

Attacks on civilians and armed clashes are the most frequent forms of violence across the country. From 1 January 2025 to 31 March 2026, the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) recorded 184 violent incidents resulting in 349 casualties in total, including at least 223 civilians. The provinces of Logone Occidental and Moyen-Chari in the south, Lake province in the west, and Wadi Fira and Ouaddaï in the east were the regions most affected by this violence. While ACLED's conservative approach may lead to an underestimation of the number of victims, its figures are put into perspective by those of the United Nations, which are based on a different methodology. Thus, while ACLED recorded at least 168 civilian casualties across the country in 2025, the United Nations counted 200 casualties due to inter-communal conflicts alone during the same period, as well as around a hundred due to jihadist violence.

The last major clashes between northern or southern rebel movements and the Chadian armed forces occurred in 2023. Such confrontations were rare in 2025 and 2026. Rebel fighters based in the north have often turned to income-generating activities such as smuggling and mining. These groups also have to deal with joint forces being deployed to secure the borders, bringing together the Chadian army with Libyan and Central African national forces.

Cedoca has found no recent information on military operations by the two main armed groups in northern Chad: the Front pour l’alternance et la concorde au Tchad (FACT) and the Conseil de commandement militaire pour le salut de la République (CCMSR). These groups no longer pose an imminent threat to the regime. However, in late 2025, several rebel movements, including the FACT and the CCMSR, met abroad with a view to uniting their forces.

Along the Sudanese border in the east, Chad has become a major host country, sheltering nearly 1.2 million Sudanese refugees and Chadian returnees. This massive influx into the poor and vulnerable eastern provinces exceeds local humanitarian capacities and fuels insecurity and hostile sentiments among host communities, exacerbating identity-based tensions between Arab and non-Arab populations.

Chad has authorised the delivery of Emirati military aid to the Sudanese paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) despite their war crimes against the non-Arab population in Darfur. This collaboration is fuelling discontent within the Zaghawa community and divisions within the regime. Following several fatal incidents on the Chadian side of the border attributed to the RSF, the government appears to be distancing itself from these paramilitary groups.

The south of the country is marked by multidimensional crises, notably the volatile security situation in the Central African Republic (CAR), inter-communal conflicts, kidnappings for ransom, and food and health insecurity. Small rebel groups remain active there, but clashes have been sporadic, despite two ambushes targeting the army in January 2026.

In the west, the two branches of the Nigerian sect Boko Haram remain active in the provinces bordering Lake Chad. Despite suffering considerable losses in various military operations, the jihadists have managed to reorganise and recruit young Chadians. They carry out attacks against government targets and local populations, although sources noted a decrease in civilian casualties attributed to the jihadists in 2025. The approximately 243,000 internally displaced persons, all of whom are located in the Lake region, are living in precarious conditions.

Climate disruption, demographic pressure, and the increasing scarcity of natural resources are causing herders to move towards agricultural areas in the south more frequently. Agro-pastoral conflicts repeatedly occur during this transhumance and have reached an unprecedented level since 2021, particularly in the south and centre of the country. Other communal tensions occasionally flare up in different parts of the country. Peaks in the number of civilian casualties in Chad in 2024 and 2025 are all linked to agro-pastoral and inter-community conflicts.

The violent conflicts disrupting the country’s various border regions do not affect the capital, N’Djamena.

Extreme poverty, food insecurity – particularly in the western provinces and the Lake Province – and acute malnutrition affect a large part of the country.