Situatieschets

Het doel van dit onderzoek is een stand van zaken op te maken over de algemene situatie in Venezuela. Het onderzoek richt zich hierbij op de politieke situatie, de veiligheidssituatie en de socio-economische situatie van het land om een zo breed mogelijke analyse te maken van de huidige stand van zaken. De situatie van specifieke profielen, zoals bijvoorbeeld journalisten of politieke activisten, vormen geen voorwerp van deze analyse. Deze COI Focus richt zich in het bijzonder op de periode van september 2024 tot januari 2026 en is een update van het gelijknamige rapport van 16 september 2024. Het onderzoek werd afgesloten op 26 januari 2026.

The political landscape in Venezuela has undergone a radical transformation since the 2024 presidential election, in which Nicolás Maduro was declared the winner by the Venezuelan authorities – a result disputed by independent observers and the opposition. The elections took place amid a climate of political persecution: opposition leader María Corina Machado was disqualified from standing as a presidential candidate, and her replacement, Edmundo González, who also claimed victory, was forced to flee to Spain. Shortly after the elections, protests broke out across the country. The authorities cracked down hard, arresting over 2,000 opponents and demonstrators.

Maduro's third term began in January 2025, which coincided with Donald Trump's inauguration for a new term as President of the United State (US). This led to a shift in US policy towards Venezuela. Throughout 2025, the US increased pressure on Maduro's regime by arranging a visit from a Trump administration official to negotiate a prisoner exchange and by resuming deportation flights to Venezuela, resulting in the deportation of over 200 alleged members of the Tren de Aragua gang to a high-security prison in El Salvador. From mid-2025 onwards, the US war fleet off the coast of Venezuela posed an increasing military threat. Officially, this was an operation against drug cartels, including the Cartel de los Soles, which the Trump administration claimed was headed by Maduro. At the same time, Maduro took measures to strengthen domestic security. Further escalation occurred in autumn 2025 due to US attacks on alleged drug boats and actions against Venezuelan oil exports. On 3 January 2026, the US carried out a military intervention on Venezuelan soil, capturing Maduro and his wife and transferring them to New York. Rather than opposition leader Machado, who won the Nobel Peace Prize in October 2025, the US put forward Vice-President Delcy Rodríguez as Maduro's successor. During her first month as interim president, Rodríguez signed oil agreements with the US, liberalised the economy, released political prisoners, and replaced Maduro's allies in government and the army. There has been no political change or dismantling of the repressive apparatus thus far. An emergency decree authorised the arrest of individuals supporting the US operation, and security services and paramilitary colectivos established checkpoints in Caracas and other cities to inspect vehicles and phones. This has led to arbitrary detentions and a tense climate.

According to the sources consulted, Venezuela continued to be plagued by high levels of violence during the reference period, although the figures show a continued downward trend compared to previous years. Venezuela ranks eleventh on the InSight Crime Homicide Round-Up for 2024. The national rate of violent deaths in 2024 was 26.2 per 100,000 people, compared to 26.8 per 100,000 people in 2023. The Venezuelan Observatory of Violence reported that Aragua was the most violent state in 2024, with 58.8 violent deaths per 100,000 inhabitants, followed by the capital district with 48.2 violent deaths per 100,000 inhabitants.

Various armed groups are active in Venezuela, ranging from megabandas and colectivos to sindicatos and large drug trafficking organisations, as well as Colombian guerrilla groups. In recent years, the power and territorial presence of the security forces has weakened further, while the power of non-state armed groups has grown. There has been a clear increase in the number of areas where political control and public services are exercised by these groups. The authorities also cooperate effectively with some of these criminal organisations. Colombian rebel groups play a key role in border areas and regions rich in natural resources. In 2025, the most influential actor was the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN).

However, since 2022, large-scale operations against criminal gangs have become a central pillar of the authorities' security strategy. Various operations took place in 2024 and 2025, including those targeting the Wilexis gang in Petare and the criminal groups responsible for illegal mining in Amazonas. Analysts speak of the selective nature of these security operations, which target only those criminal organisations that do not cooperate with the authorities. According to various sources, the decline in violence is not solely the result of these increased security operations, but is also due to the ongoing emigration of Venezuelans and the consolidation of territory by a few larger criminal organisations. These organisations are increasingly resorting to imposing social control on residents rather than using violence to maintain control of territory.

Venezuela has been experiencing a serious socio-economic crisis for over ten consecutive years. Severe economic sanctions, declining oil production, hyperinflation, and an ongoing contraction of the economy mean that many Venezuelans are unable to meet their basic needs.

De facto dollarisation took place in the country throughout 2019-2021, leading to a slight economic recovery. Venezuela saw economic growth in 2024. Nevertheless, much of the population continued to struggle with high living costs, reduced purchasing power, and shortages of essential goods at a local level. Research by the Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de Vida into living conditions in Venezuela shows that 73.2% of households were affected by poverty in 2024, with 36.5% living in extreme poverty. Access to basic services such as electricity and running water is often unreliable in Venezuela. The economic crisis is also affecting healthcare and education. Both sectors have experienced significant staff migration. In addition, hospitals are facing severe shortages of medicines and infrastructure. The infrastructure and quality of education have both deteriorated significantly. Student absenteeism is high.

Following years of declining inflation, the inflation rate soared again in 2025 due to falling oil revenues and the devaluation of the bolívar. However, the bleak economic outlook soon improved when the interim president injected $300 million from an initial oil sale in cooperation with the US into the banking system in an attempt to stabilise the economy.

As a consequence of the ongoing humanitarian crisis, Venezuela has witnessed the largest exodus in recent Latin American history. By November 2024, nearly eight million Venezuelans had left their country, with the vast majority settling in neighbouring countries, particularly Colombia. In 2025, the US deported around 17,000 Venezuelans back to Venezuela.