Violence in South Sudan has been steadily escalating since late 2024. In March 2025, President Kiir dismissed his first vice-president, Machar, and placed him under house arrest. In September 2025, the government charged Machar and 20 co-defendants from the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-in-Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) with treason and crimes against humanity. During the ongoing trial, they have been accused of being involved in an attack on a military barracks in Nasir in March 2025. At that time, a United Nations helicopter was attacked by White Army militants, a Nuer militia group with links to Machar. This resulted in the deaths of a general and several soldiers. Following this incident, violence escalated in Upper Nile. The South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) and allied troops carried out a series of indiscriminate air strikes on settlements and other civilian areas, resulting in civilian casualties and the displacement of civilians.
The violence spread geographically to Jonglei, which, like Upper Nile and Unity, is long regarded as an opposition stronghold. From July to September 2025, ongoing armed conflict between the SSPDF and allied armed groups, and the SPLA-IO and allied militias (primarily the White Army) further deteriorated the security situation in Jonglei and Upper Nile states. These confrontations were accompanied by indiscriminate air strikes, shelling and bombardments, resulting in an unknown number of civilian casualties and forced displacement.
According to the UN, the death toll resulting from the conflict between January and September 2025 was almost 60% higher than in the same period the previous year. Around 321,000 people were displaced by violence in 2025, with over 100,000 fleeing to war-torn Sudan. Food security experts are warning of famine in areas cut off from humanitarian aid by air strikes.
Between late December 2025 and early January 2026, armed opposition groups and allied militias seized control of significant areas, primarily in Jonglei State. Evacuation orders forced Nuer civilians to flee areas under the control of the SPLM/A-IO. A video from mid-January 2026, in which General Johnson Olony can be seen addressing his troops in Duk district (Jonglei) and calling on them to spare no one, has heightened fears of mass crimes against the civilian population. The opposition's territorial gains in Jonglei were largely reversed by a large-scale government counter-offensive in the second half of January 2026. According to sources, these hostilities are bringing South Sudan dangerously close to renewed civil war.
For the period from January to December 2025, ACLED recorded 706 incidents in the Greater Upper Nile province, which comprises the states of Upper Nile, Unity, and Jonglei. ACLED classified 317 of these incidents as battles, 139 as explosions/remote violence and 250 as violence against civilians.
Since early 2025, violations of international humanitarian law have occurred during fighting between government forces and armed opposition groups in Upper Nile and Jonglei states. These violations include the killing of civilians, forced recruitment, sexual violence, attacks on civilian infrastructure, severe restrictions on freedom of movement, and the denial of humanitarian aid. Civilians have also been killed or injured, displaced, or have lost family members, when caught in the crossfire during fighting and indiscriminate attacks. In early February 2026, the UN reported that 280,000 people had been displaced since December 2025, including 235,000 in Jonglei.
The rivalry between Kiir and Machar is both political and ethnic. Both leaders have been accused of exploiting historical grievances to mobilise their respective Dinka and Nuer supporters. However, this binary approach obscures the true complexity of the violence in South Sudan. Experts consulted by Cedoca for this study indicate that targeted violence is being perpetrated against the Nuer in opposition-controlled areas. Outside these areas, Nuer civilians face the threat of violence as they are easily branded as rebels or opposition members. When asked whether similar ethnic violence occurs against other ethnic groups in South Sudan, most experts highlight a difference in the level of targeted violence. They argue that the Nuer face greater violence than other groups. The experts suggest that this is primarily due to the threat that the government attributes to this group.
Policy
The policy implemented by the Commissioner General is based on a thorough analysis of accurate and up-to-date information on the general situation in the country of origin. This information is collated in a professional manner from various, objective sources, including the EUAA, the UNHCR, relevant international human rights organisations, non-governmental organisations, professional literature and coverage in the media. When determining policy, the Commissioner General does not only examine the COI Focuses written by Cedoca and published on this website, as these deal with just one aspect of the general situation in the country of origin. The fact that a COI Focus could be out-of-date does not mean that the policy that is being implemented by the Commissioner General is no longer up-to-date.
When assessing an application for asylum, the Commissioner General not only considers the actual situation in the country of origin at the moment of decision-making, he also takes into account the individual situation and personal circumstances of the applicant for international protection. Every asylum application is examined individually. An applicant must comprehensively demonstrate that he has a well-founded fear of persecution or that there is a clear personal risk of serious harm. He cannot, therefore, simply refer back to the general conditions in his country, but must also present concrete, credible and personal facts.
There is no policy paper for this country available on the website.