Politieke situatie

The Velvet Revolution in April 2018 resulted in a change of power that left the former ruling authorities in the opposition. Armenia has since been ruled by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, former opposition leader and founder of the Civil Contract party. The country faced several crises in 2020, starting with the COVID-19 epidemic and, in the autumn of 2020, the 44-day war in Nagorno Karabakh. In the following years, a number of events related to the conflict with Azerbaijan put pressure on the government. These included a brief flare-up of violence on the border in September 2022, the months-long blockade of Nagorno Karabakh in 2023 and the eventual surrender of the region in September 2023. Subsequent negotiations with Azerbaijan over the demarcation of the border between the two countries caused further discontent and attempts by the opposition to oust the government through anti-government demonstrations. The return of four Azerbaijani exclaves on Armenian territory in April 2024 was another trigger for calls for the government's resignation and protests, this time led by a regional archbishop. These actions failed to persuade the prime minister to resign. Despite Pashinyan's waning popularity as a result of the above events, he continues to enjoy the most support, according to opinion polls. The opposition, still led by figures associated with the corrupt and authoritarian former regime, remains far less popular than Pashinyan.

Despite a wide range of political parties, the number of active parties is very limited. Political parties tend to revolve around an individual rather than a party programme or ideology. Several sources report a shift from democratic rhetoric and practices towards an authoritarian political system in 2024. Power is mainly concentrated with the prime minister and his entourage while the opposition has little  say. Parliament, which is largely controlled by Civil Contract, has limited powers of control over the government. A lot of staff in government agencies, both in senior and middle positions, as well as a  considerable number of judges, have been replaced by people loyal to the ruling party. Political influence on the judicial system remains, but to a lesser extent than before the revolution. Unlike under the previous regime, it is currently difficult to influence or bribe a judge or a law enforcement officer. In the case of minor offences, it may be possible to pay a bribe in the initial stages, especially at the time of arrest, to prevent a case from being investigated further.

Political opponents regularly portray each other as a threat to national security, which has a negative impact on the democratisation process. Political polarisation manifests itself mainly between close supporters of the government on the one hand and the opposition on the other, i.e. the pre-revolutionary political elite and their allies. Unlike under the previous regime, there are little or no restrictions to openly expressing political opinions. In response to increasing hateful rhetoric and an increased risk of serious crimes in the aftermath of the war, there was a short-lived legal initiative to criminalise insulting people in public office. The new Penal Code, in force since July 1, 2022, no longer includes this article. As a result, all pending cases were dismissed. A charge of online hooliganism against two bloggers in March 2024, following offensive messages towards the prime minister in their podcast, raised concerns among human rights organisations about the right to freedom of expression, as well as its effect on others. Openly calling for violence or justifying violence through hate speech also remains punishable and appears to be selectively applied to government critics.

Opposition leaders tend to portray lawsuits against opposition figures as politically motivated because of their (former) position. However, according to multiple sources, there is little or no political persecution. A case can be considered politically motivated when one person is prosecuted and another is not in similar circumstances. This is notable, for example, in the run-up to elections when court cases are opened or reopened against opposition figures. Multiple sources point out that in most court cases, there is a valid reason to initiate criminal proceedings, but not everyone is prosecuted in the same way for the same type of crime. It is unlikely that anyone who has not committed a crime will be prosecuted.

After coming to power in 2018, the government promised to implement a series of reforms and address some well-established problems, including systemic corruption. Between 2019-2023, several anti-corruption agencies came into operation and numerous corruption investigations were launched, mainly against former government representatives, their relatives and other influential people linked to the previous regime. Corruption investigations were also launched against some members of the current authorities. So far, there have been no convictions in high-profile corruption cases. Lawsuits against two ex-presidents were closed without conviction, or withdrawn for lack of evidence. Court cases tend to drag on for a long time, which is considered to be one of the main problems in the judiciary, along with a lack of efficiency.

Despite many shortcomings, the judicial system is generally considered to be accessible and sufficiently independent. In some high-profile court cases, there may be political motives, but in other cases the judicial process is mostly fair and judges make correct decisions. Multiple sources point to the importance of having a good lawyer to improve the chances of obtaining justice. This can be a barrier for less well-off individuals. Alternatively, they may turn to free public defenders or pro bono lawyers, who tend to be less experienced and understaffed, making them less trustworthy.

Of all law enforcement agencies, the police are the second most trusted after the army. The image of the police has greatly improved because of the new Patrol Police. Paying bribes to the police is no longer an issue since their introduction. People may be reluctant to contact the police because of a post-Soviet mentality, whereby it is seen as problematic to involve the police. A lack of confidence that the case will be investigated or dealt with effectively can also be a barrier. However, it is unlikely that someone will refrain from seeking help from the police out of fear of reprisals.

The influence of former rulers and oligarchs declined significantly after the revolution. Influential figures from the previous regime might still to use former connections, for example to force someone to keep quiet. Influencing or intimidating witnesses is punishable and is not a widespread practice. Witnesses may be reluctant to testify because of past connections, partly so as not to betray the trust of their former boss or colleagues, but also out of fear of having to speak about their own involvement in a corrupt network and being prosecuted for it. Existing witness protection mechanisms have shortcomings.

During several demonstrations, the police cracked down on protesters and made arrests. This happened mainly when the protest itself was not peaceful. There were situations where the police used excessive force against demonstrators. Human rights organisations complained that no one has been held responsible or convicted for police violence, unlike some demonstrators who have been prosecuted. Usually, people do not experience further problems following their participation or arrest during a protest.