Hostilities in the northern Tigray region, which began in November 2020 and ended in November 2022, were accompanied by the repression and arrest of Tigrayans across the rest of the country. The scale of the arrest campaigns varied during the conflict and occurred in waves, reflecting developments on the battlefield.
Measures targeting Tigrayans decreased significantly after the lifting of the state of emergency in February 2022 and after the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) between the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the federal government in November 2022. Sources indicate that despite the apparent return to normal life after the CoHA, many Tigrayans have lost their trust in the Ethiopian state. Many are still experiencing psychological and socio-economic consequences of the measures to which they were subjected between November 2020 and November 2022.
The sources interviewed by Cedoca during its research mission to Ethiopia in November 2023 reported that all Tigrayans who were arrested and detained under the state of emergency were gradually released after the state of emergency was lifted in February 2022, with the exception of those against whom legal proceedings were pending or those who had been convicted.
These sources reported an improvement in the situation for Tigrayans in the capital, stating that there was no longer any discrimination against them by the authorities. However, a few sources mentioned that the general human rights situation in the country was deteriorating, with the authorities focusing more on people of Amhara origin.
In June 2024, officials from the UK Home Office conducted a fact-finding mission to Ethiopia. In their report, they stated that while there is no legal discrimination against Tigrayans, their position and influence in Ethiopian society has declined as a result of the conflict. Tigrayans in Addis Ababa can access healthcare, education and housing if they can afford the costs. Other activities, including setting up a business and opening a bank account, are only possible with an Addis Ababa city ID card. Tigrayans can sometimes obtain such a card, but this is difficult as it requires, among other things, a letter of authorisation from the kebele where the person previously lived. A number of sources reported that Tigrayans often purchase an Addis Ababa city ID card in exchange for bribes.
At the time of finalising this COI Focus in October 2025, Tigrayans were still largely underrepresented in federal institutions such as parliament, ministries and federal courts, as well as security institutions such as the army, the police and the intelligence services.
Rumours about the arrest of young Tigrayans in the capital circulated at the end of March and in April 2024. These arrests may have been the result of an alleged alliance between Fano groups and the Tigray Defence Forces (TDF). Two sources reported that arrests of Tigrayans were taking place in the capital, but that the number of detainees and the length of detention differed from the situation during the war. According to one source, these arrests mainly concerned Tigrayans affiliated with the TDF, Tigrayans without valid identity documents, Tigrayans who congregated in bars and coffee houses, and street vendors, beggars and homeless people.
During their fact-finding mission in June 2024, the UK Home Office interviewed sources who indicated that there were no longer any systematic or large-scale arrests and detentions of Tigrayans. However, as with other population groups, they could still fall victim to arbitrary arrests. These arrests sometimes occurred before public holidays or major public events, but also as a result of opportunistic, short-term detentions (lasting a day or two) intended to extort bribes.
At the end of June 2025, the human rights organisation Human Rights First - Ethiopia (HRFE) and a number of newspaper articles reported that the authorities in Addis Ababa were carrying out arbitrary arrests of Tigrayans on the basis of their identity, without formal charges or judicial oversight. Although the reason for the arrests was unclear, Ethiopia Observer pointed to the tense relationship between the interim government in Tigray and the federal government as a possible explanation. A lawyer working for a local human rights organisation suggested that the reasons might include corruption as well as the relations between the TPLF and Eritrea, which Ethiopia views with great suspicion. In June 2025, Ethiopia wrote a letter to the United Nations claiming that the TPLF and Eritrea were planning a joint offensive. According to a lawyer, the detainees were released approximately ten days after the arrests were reported in the media.
Cedoca found no indications in the sources consulted that arrests of Tigrayans in Addis Ababa are systematic.
Information on the treatment of returnees of Tigrayan ethnicity by the Ethiopian authorities during the research period (June 2024 – September 2025) is scarce. According to Eurostat data, between June 2024 and June 2025, a total of 1,810 Ethiopians were ordered to leave the European Union (EU), 270 of whom (15%) returned to Ethiopia.
Cedoca found no reports in the public sources consulted of Tigrayans encountering problems upon arrival in Addis Ababa after returning from abroad during the research period. A lawyer indicated that those arrested in June 2025 included returnees from Tigray. However, there is no indication that the returnees were the target of the arrests.
Policy
The policy implemented by the Commissioner General is based on a thorough analysis of accurate and up-to-date information on the general situation in the country of origin. This information is collated in a professional manner from various, objective sources, including the EUAA, the UNHCR, relevant international human rights organisations, non-governmental organisations, professional literature and coverage in the media. When determining policy, the Commissioner General does not only examine the COI Focuses written by Cedoca and published on this website, as these deal with just one aspect of the general situation in the country of origin. The fact that a COI Focus could be out-of-date does not mean that the policy that is being implemented by the Commissioner General is no longer up-to-date.
When assessing an application for asylum, the Commissioner General not only considers the actual situation in the country of origin at the moment of decision-making, he also takes into account the individual situation and personal circumstances of the applicant for international protection. Every asylum application is examined individually. An applicant must comprehensively demonstrate that he has a well-founded fear of persecution or that there is a clear personal risk of serious harm. He cannot, therefore, simply refer back to the general conditions in his country, but must also present concrete, credible and personal facts.
There is no policy paper for this country available on the website.